Symposium Keynote: India and China in the Evolving International System by Brown, Seyom
Symposium Keynote: India and China in the
Evolving International System
SEYOM BROWN*
The legal and economic systems of India and China, particularly the interactions be-
tween law and the economy within both countries-the primary focus of this symposium,
are increasingly affected by the evolving international economy and polity. And unavoid-
ably, there is a dramatic feedback relationship: as the growing economy in each becomes
more intertwined with the global economy and laws, progressively what they do at home
has an impact abroad. Here, then, is my overview of the opportunities and problems that
the structure and behavior of the international system poses for India and China and for
their bilateral relationship, as well as of the effects that developments in and between both
countries are having on global economic, environmental, and political conditions. I also
take the liberty of commenting on the new set of obligations to serve world interests that
the two Asian giants should be taking on along with their emergent "great power" status.,
I. The Polyarchic International System
India and China each reject the notion that the post-Cold War international system is
"unipolar:" that it operates, or should operate, under the hegemonic direction of the
United States. But they differ in their views of the structure of the evolving international
system-what it is, and what should be its configuration. China's leaders, resisting U.S.
assertions of primacy, lose no opportunity, along with their counterparts in Europe and
Japan, to assert that the world is "multipolar." The problem with the multipolar model,
however, is that like the unipolar model, it too fails to match the structural realities of the
international system and the way that states and other actors in the system are behaving.
None of the big five (or six or seven) is capable of exercising the degree of control over its
regional neighbors necessary to warrant being regarded as the region's polar power, and
any such pretention of regional hegemony is resisted by its neighbors. This is certainly
the case in Asia where neither India, China, nor Japan will allow any of the others the
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mantel of the region's polar power. Even in sub-regions-say, Southeast Asia-neither
Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, nor the Philippines (forget Australia)-is in-
clined to grant primacy to the others.
Rather, as if India's professed "nonalignment" has become the order of the day, most
countries, determined to ensure their ability to control their own affairs and to maximize
their bargaining power with other countries, have been diversifying their active interna-
tional relationships-in trade, investments, technological cooperation, and mutual secur-
ity arrangements. This pattern of diversifying one's (inter)dependence relationships, as
opposed to consolidating a bilateral relationship or alliance with a particular benefactor, is
characteristic of today's international politics around the globe: in South Asia, Northeast
Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, the Americas, and Europe.
The diversification of dependency, the diffusion of power, and the multi-dimensionality
of power have dissipated the magnetic pull that either global or regional hegemons re-
quire to sustain unipolarity or multipolarity. As a result, hardly any countries are
unidirectionally aligned in their major international relationships. Allies on one issue (for
example, strengthening international policing against terrorism) may be adversaries on
others (for example, the right of self-determination for ethnic minorities or the location of
pipelines for transporting Eurasian oil); and today's partner may be tomorrow's rival and
vice versa, depending on the issue at hand. Neither unipolar nor multipolar, the emergent
global system is not so much anarchic as it is polyarchic.
The polyarchy comprises nation-states, subnational groups, transnational special inter-
ests and religious and ethnic communities, and multilateral institutions, regional and
-global, some with supranational powers. The members of these various entities are simul-
taneously members of some of the other entities, which are often in competition with one
another for resources and loyalty on the part of their constituents. The resulting cross-
pressures on countries, political movements, and peoples can have both positive and nega-
tive effects on countries' national interests and world interests.
Positively, the polyarchic cross-pressures can make it difficult to whip up the total na-
tion-versus-nation hostility, class conflict, and the kinds of religious-sectarian hatred that
lead to major war and violent conflict of genocidal proportion. Negatively, the cross-
pressures and the volatility of alignments and antagonisms make it difficult to put together
and sustain multilateral collective action to provide the international public goods that the
world needs today-including collective deterrence and defense against cross-border ag-
gression and sponsorship of insurgencies and subversive movements in neighboring
countries.
H. Sino-Indian Geopolitics in the Polyarchy
The cross-pressures in the emergent polyarchy militate against a new border war be-
tween China and India, and make it unlikely that China will be, as in the past, inclined to
strongly back Pakistan against India in another confrontation over Kashmir. Yet neither
views with equanimity their respective military buildups and the possibility that they
might find themselves in a dispute with one another in which the "balance of power"
between them could determine the outcome. The Chinese continue to size their military
forces for a cross-strait war against an independence-asserting Taiwan and to deter the
United States from entering the fray. And Beijing, even in the current era of good feeling
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with Moscow, can claim that the ever-present possibility of a new flare-up of conflicts
involving rival claims of jurisdiction over the Eurasian peoples along their 4,300 kilometer
common border (despite recent agreements) requires the retention of a hefty Peoples Lib-
eration Army. Yet Indian military planners fear these military capabilities could some day
be turned southwest instead of north. And notwithstanding mutual affirmations of peace-
ful coexistence, the Chinese are persisting in various ambiguous (possibly military-related)
infrastructure projects at India-China border areas. Moreover, some of these projects,
ostensibly designed only to further the economic development of the remote areas - espe-
cially the dams the Chinese are building on the rivers that supply India with much of her
water - could be turned to coercive purposes in the event of a future Sino-Indian
confrontation.
Indian national security planners, wary of a coalition of radical jihadists and hawkish
military factions coming to power in Islamabad who inigL uy a full-blown insurrection in
Indian-controlled Kashmir, are convinced that unambiguous Indian military superiority
over Pakistan, including nuclear superiority, is absolutely necessary to dissuade the Pakis-
tanis from reckless behavior. But this requires New Delhi to invest in force-buildups,
including intermediate-range ballistic missiles, that Beijing sees potentially usable against
China. (As the quip goes, "paranoids often do have real enemies;" and India's defense
buildup is, to be sure, no less motivated by the objective of providing her with at least an
"assured destruction" deterrent against China). Moreover, both China and India, under
the rationale of being able to secure tanker access routes to Persian Gulf oil, have each
embarked on major buildups of their navieg to provide themselves with a "power projec-
tion" capability.
1H. Getting Real about Panchsheel
Meanwhile, at the Himalayan rhetorical levels of summit diplomacy, the plenipotentia-
ries of China and India ritualistically endorse the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,
or Panchsheel, first proclaimed more than a half century ago by Jawaharlal Nehru and on
Zhou Enlai:
1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty
2. Mutual non-aggression
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs
4. Equality and mutual benefit
5. Peaceful co-existence
True to form, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Premier Wen Jiabao, meeting in
Beijing in January 2008 affirmed that their "Shared Vision for the 21st Century" embod-
ied the Pancbsheel, which should "constitute the basic guiding principles for good relations
between all countries and for realizing peace and progress of humankind."
On the ground, however, with military contingents along the passes between the moun-
tain peaks, with the heavily-guarded construction teams building roads into disputed bor-
der areas and canals to divert scarce water from the headwaters of rivers originating in
China but flowing to India; at sea, in naval ships engaged in simulations of confrontations
along the navigation routes from the Indian Ocean to Persian Gulf sources of oil; in com-
mand centers for launching nuclear capable missiles, space probes, communications satel-
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lites, and anti-satellite missiles against future military spacecraft-the intensifying power
rivalry is a counterpoint to the norms of peaceful co-existence.
Getting real about Panchsheel, however, does not mean dismissing the principles as fatu-
ous or utopian. On the contrary, commitments of peaceful coexistence are of increasing
importance precisely because of the risks that these two Asian (and global) gi-
ants-obviously competing with one another as models of political and economic develop-
ment, and requiring sustained nationalistic unity to overcome the frustrations and
potentially dangerous impatience of majorities left behind by uneven economic growth-
could misconstrue each other's deployments and posturing as threats to their own security
when they were actually directed, at least in the short term, primarily against others.
There is no escaping the fact that the Sino-Indian relationship is a mix of conflicting
and compatible national interests. The regional polyarchy (involving not only India, Paki-
stan, Afghanistan, Iran, Burma, and China, but also the United States and Russia) at best
can sustain a somewhat unstable equilibrium between Beijing and New Delhi. At worst,
the uncertainties of who is on whose side on what issues with what degree of commitment
can generate the kinds of paranoid misperceptions and miscalculations that typically lead
to war.
The cross-cutting and fluctuating relationships of polyarchy are prototypically present
in Afghanistan, where India, the United States, China, and Iran, with quite different moti-
vations, have been supporting the Karzai government - an alignment regarded in Is-
lamabad as serving India's grand strategy of encircling and hemming in Pakistan. Iran has
its own concerns. Its earlier warm, now luke-warm support of the anti-Taliban campaign
has been driven by the intense anti-Shiite record of the Sunni Taliban; but Teheran could
do a "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" turnabout should the U.S.-Iranian relation-
ship head toward war. Pakistan's worry about encirclement does have some basis in fact.
India has offered to train the Afghan military, has been opening up consulates along the
Afghan-Pakistan border, and has supported a major road-building project to the Iranian
border. India is of course genuinely opposed to the radical brand of Islam represented by
the Taliban and their allies among al Qaeda, and other transnational jihadists located in
Pakistan's northwest. One of Islamabad's nightmares, however, is a collapse of the
NATO/U.S. campaign against the Taliban that would result in India's taking up the bur-
den of containing the jihadists by deploying its own troops into eastern Afghanistan, and
even actively supporting the anti-Pakistan separatist movements in the Pashtun and Balu-
chistan areas. Yet for these contingencies, Pakistan could not confidently rely on China,
for whom Afghanistan is not all that salient, to provide a counterweight to India.
During the latter stages of the Cold War (when Beijing felt threatened by Moscow's
hegemonic objectives in Asia) China was ready to help Pakistan balance India's power
(then substantially based on military and economic assistance from the Soviet Union). But
today, China no longer appears to regard India through the lens of the Sino-Russian ri-
valry. China and Russia have shifted toward moderating one another's regional hege-
monic aspirations through their jointly-run Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Meanwhile, India's increasing arms purchases from the United States and decreasing
purchases from Russia, plus the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal, from Beijing's perspective, looks
like collusion to build up India's power vis-a-vis China. Likewise, Beijing's persisting mil-
itary sales and assistance to Pakistan and Burma are regarded in Washington and New
Delhi as being motivated by China's increasing focus on India as its principal regional, and
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ultimately global, rival, which explains India's own active pursuit of good relations with
the Burmese regime despite the junta's abysmal human rights record.
Thus, the geopolitical context surrounding and infusing Panchsheel has undergone a
substantial metamorphosis over the decades since the Nehru-Zhou EnLai proclamation.
In the 1950s, the Sino-Indian dance of cooperation and conflict was a sideshow in the
global arena of the U.S.-Soviet power rivalry. Beijing's objective, despite disputes over
the location of the border between China and India, was to keep India from seeking pro-
tection and arms from the United States. Nehru's objective, in addition to keeping border
disputes from getting out of hand, was part and parcel of his grand strategy of resisting the
bipolarization of world politics-leading him to accept China's membership in the
"nonaligned" movement. The 1960s and early 1970s, with the emergence and widening
of the Sino-Soviet split, was the most dangerous era for the relationship between China
and India, with Beijig' backing Pakistan m the 197l war over Bangladesh, and Moscow
backing India. It was also the worst period for the U.S.-Indian relationship, as the Nixon
administration, then still giving priority to its opening to China ahead of d~tente with
Russia, tilted toward Pakistan. The depolarization of international relations over the en-
suing two decades (despite the efforts of Ronald Reagan during his first term to revive the
communism versus democratic capitalism definition of global politics) encouraged both
Beijing and New Delhi to substantially de-politicize their foreign policies - establishing
their own bilateral and multilateral economic relationships in the region and globally on
the basis of pragmatic self-interest considerations. And with the disappearance of the
Cold War system, in which the contest for ascendancy between the two superpowers sub-
stantially determined who got what, when, and how in the world, India and China, now
weighty players in the central arenas of the global economy and polity, are themselves
influencing how the larger system works and are no longer only its creatures. This heady
sense of their own power can be liberating in that New Delhi and Beijing do not have to
worry much about alienating any superpowers. But it also can lead dangerously to less
constrained foreign policies, including toward one another, and thus to the continuing, if
not increased importance of Pancbsheel.
IV. Global Power and Global Responsibilities
China and India, each having ascended to the rank of global "great power" - a country
whose economic and/or military weight, if added or opposed to programs or projects of
worldwide significance, will be crucial to their success or failure - have a compelling claim
to a seat at most councils of decision on matters of global impact. The serious considera-
tion now being given to India's bid to become a permanent member of the United Na-
tions Security Council reflects such elementary prudence, as would the willingness of the
so-called advanced industrial countries to enlarge their limited-membership "Group" con-
ferences to include these two Asian giants, not just Japan.
Being a global power however also carries with it responsibilities toward the global
society - increasingly interdependent in its material dimensions, but severely lagging in
shared responsibility for providing for essential global public goods and world interests.
As the only two "developing" countries (with the possible exception of Brazil) who have
made it into the great-power category (although continuing to face daunting internal chal-
lenges of further economic development and domestic peace and security), their leader-
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ship (or lack thereof) on international issues crucial to the transformation of
interdependent global society into a genuine global community of accountability and care
will have a lot to do with whether polyarchy goes the other way: degenerating into a
Hobbesian world in which force is the principal determinant of who gets what, when, and
how.
No longer simply victims of the world system, but now also significant perpetrators of
the system's ills, China and India - in the ways they deal with one another, and with other
nations -will have to take increasing responsibility along with the United States, the major
European countries, Russia, and Japan for advancing or dangerously neglecting the fol-
lowing global public goods and world interests:
Ensuring the healthy survival of the human species. This requires, with special ur-
gency, bringing two threats under control: (1) the further spread of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and the likelihood that countries possessing them will resort to their
use in conflict; and (2) the increase in global warming to levels where the prospects of its
harm to billions of people will be irreversible. The records of India and China are at best
ambiguous and ambivalent with respect to the WMD problem. And with respect to
global warming, they and the United States (the three being the main culprits) are still
woefully lagging in their willingness to do what is needed to counteract this dangerous
trend before it reaches the tipping point of irreversibility.
Reducing the role of force in world politics. In addition to taking a more forthright
stance on preventing the spread and use of WMD, both countries, rather indifferent to
the nature of the regimes to which they sell arms and the uses to which they may be put,
should be helping to reign in the burgeoning global arms bazaar. Reducing the role of
force also requires fostering a greater reliance internationally on the arts, processes, and
institutions of conflict moderation and a reduced reliance on saber rattling, publicized
tests of the weapons in one's arsenal, and coercive diplomacy. Neither China nor India
(despite the Gandhian tradition still invoked by some of its leaders and Indian participa-
tion in international peacekeeping) has an exemplary record in regard to this world inter-
est. (Although to be clear, neither does the United States).
Maintaining a well-functioning global economy. Although China and India have
been very active in international institutions (the International Monetary Fund, World
Bank, and World Trade Organization) and forums (e.g., the Doha Round) in demanding
the elimination of barriers to their products and investments, their records are hardly
stellar when it comes to reducing their own barriers not only to the entry of goods and
assets from the industrialized world into their own markets, but also to lower-priced im-
ports from developing countries. Demands for reciprocity in the reduction of such barri-
ers as a precondition for one's own cooperation have become a game pursued by
governments of rich and poor countries alike, catering to politically-influential but eco-
nomically uncompetitive sectors of their societies. India and China, in the world interest
and their enlightened self-interest, should be willing to join in serious efforts to break out
of this ultimately self-destructive pattern. Both countries will also need to be more ame-
nable than they have been in subjecting their decisions on the domestic supply and
purchase-value of their currencies and their international exchange rates to international
constraints, as well as in making their banking systems more transparent. During the
coming decades, there is a real danger that both countries will increase their rivalry for
foreign direct investments in various industries by promising lower factor costs (environ-
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mental controls, labor wages, and conditions), which would result in GNP growth but
perpetuate or exacerbate domestic income inequalities and poverty. But in the long run,
this would be bad - economically and politically - for China, India and the world. Bilat-
eral and multilateral consultations and cooperation to avoid this most immoral "beggar-
thy-neighbor" competition may be necessary.
Another problem that needs to be dealt with in the interest of a well-functioning global
economy is the handling of intellectual property rights. There is a legitimate case to be
made for limiting the role of copyrights on medicines and other health related research
and materials. But India and China should be wary of alienating the United States and
other countries when it comes to protecting the legitimate commercial rights of original
producers in the arts and sciences generally.
Arresting disturbances to vital ecologies. India and China, along with other coun-
tries, are sources of widespread ecological and environmental disturbances, carried by air
and water currents and by mobile wildlife and organisms, that in addition to being injuri-
ous to the health of peoples, have economic and political consequences that ultimately
threaten world peace and security. Contaminated water caused by manufacturing runoff,
mining and energy production, and sewage into streams, rivers, lakes, inland seas, and the
oceans, is the greatest cause of human sickness and death around the world, as well as a
threat to aquatic life. Severe air pollution, caused by the effluents of various industrial
processes, motor vehicles, energy-generating facilities and wildfires, is responsible for the
deaths of millions of people each year. Deforestation, in addition to being a major source
of the worsening greenhouse effect, is a cause of important biodiversity loss. Although
primary responsibility for arresting such ecological disturbances resides with the govern-
ments of China and India insofar as major disturbances are occurring within their jurisdic-
tions, the nationally formulated programs will be often insufficient in the case of global or
transborder ecologies, and national prerogatives for managing resources will have to be
shared with global or regional regimes. India and China, both very covetous of their
sovereignty over their own resources, will have to make substantial adaptations to this
world interest.
Respecting cultural diversity. One of India's proudest self-concepts is as a multi-
cultural, multi-religious country. And in this characteristic, as well as in the challenges it
has been facing in handling the difficulties of multiculturalism, India has much to share
with the world, which as a whole, but also increasingly in country after country, must
operate as a multicultural polity. (China, given the way it has repressed the Tibetans, the
Uighurs, and the Falon Gong, is more of a model as to how not to function as a multicul-
tural polity.) India is hardly an unalloyed model, however, for how to run a diverse polity.
Aggrieved linguistic, ethnic, and religious minorities have periodically staged violent pro-
tests that on occasion have been brutally put down. And the festering self-determination
demands of the Muslim-majority population of Indian-controlled Kashmir can provoke
the government in New Delhi, especially when the Hindu nationalists are in power, to
overreact. India may well be in for more international pressure to accord Kashmir greater
autonomy insofar as the United States and other governments link Pakistan's cooperation
in countering the Taliban and Al Qaeda to India-Pakistan d~tente vis-5-vis Kashmir.
Thus India's successes and failures in its great multicultural political experiment are un-
avoidably under a world spotlight.
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Accepting transnational accountability. Furthering these world interests will require
of both India and China much greater accountability to the rest of the world than either,
with deep scars from past intrusions, has deemed compatible with its sovereign preroga-
tives. But transnational - indeed, global - accountability is the key responsibility that
comes along with the prerogatives of being a great power. The accountability principle
holds that those who can or do crucially affect the well-being of others (especially by
inflicting harm) are answerable to those who they immediately and directly affect, and to
the larger society whose well-being, norms, and behavior are implicated. In its most rudi-
mentary mode, accountability means that those feeling that they have been harmed by
others are given opportunities to express their grievances, and those allegedly responsible
for the harms are expected to explain the reasons for their actions. In its higher modes,
accountability can range all the way up to institutionalized consensus rules or prohibitions
on certain members of a community acting without the approval of all the members. At
whatever level accountability processes and obligations are instituted, however, their
hallmarks are reciprocity and mutuality. As India and China become more influential
actors in the international system, each of them has the right to expect that others will be
accountable to them in the higher and substantial modes - according them weighty roles
in the councils of decision. The big question - and it will be present when it comes to
WMD controls, the abatement of global warming, limitations on the use of force, man-
agement of the global economy and ecologies, and the treatment of self-determination
movements - is whether India and China are ready to be not only mutually accountable,
but also accountable to others in the evolving world community.
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